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Abstract Australian households are increasingly vulnera-
ble to natural hazard-related disasters. To manage disaster
risk, government commissioned inquiries have called for
greater investment in mitigation. This article critically
examines the call for a shift in funding priority towards
pre-disaster mitigation measures, in the context of growing
concerns around the ability of households to access and
afford insurance. It examines mitigation measures in the
context of three prominent Australian disasters: the Black
Saturday bushfires (Victoria, 2009), the Queensland floods
(2010–2011), and Cyclone Yasi (Queensland, 2011). We
argue that as a mode of disaster security, mitigation oper-
ates as a complex assemblage of logics and practices of
protection, preparedness, and resilience, which problema-
tizes simplistic protection/resilience binaries. On the one
hand, mitigation serves as a mode of protection, which
underscores the dominant maladaptive rationality of
insurance. It promises a collective solution to uninsura-
bility that is limited by government fiscal constraints and
growing employment of risk-reflective insurance pricing.
On the other hand, there is evidence of an emergent
rationality of household insurance as a path to resilience
and preparedness—for example, in the development of
insurance systems that price household retrofitting tech-
nologies and in the development of policyholder education
campaigns. This resilience rationality holds the promise of
securing individuals previously excluded from insurance.
However, for householders lacking the necessary physical,
cognitive, and financial capacities to make themselves and
their properties resilient, the transition to a pre-disaster
mitigation mode of security will likely do little to alleviate
disadvantage and marginalization.
Keywords Australia  Disaster mitigation  Household
insurance  Household marginalization  Household
resilience  Natural hazards
1 Introduction
Most governments prioritize disaster response and recovery
over risk reduction and mitigation. In Australia and the
United States respectively, 3% and 4% of disaster spending
goes towards mitigation (Coppel and Chester 2014; Cigler
2017). Less than 40 cents of every 100 US dollars of
international aid is allocated for disaster risk reduction or
mitigation1 (Kellett and Caravani 2013). This expenditure
and investment pattern negatively impacts insurability,
particularly in the context of rising disaster costs. In 2017,
there were 330 natural hazard-related disasters globally
(97% were weather-related), resulting in an estimated
economic loss of USD 353 billion (Aon Benfield 2018). In
the same year, Australian disaster costs reached USD 9.8
billion, a cost set to double by 2038 (DAE 2017). Australia
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is prone to disasters, such as bushfires, floods, cyclones,
droughts, heatwaves, and storms. In the 10 years leading up
to 2016, the total economic cost of such disasters averaged
USD 13.5 billion per annum, which includes both tangible
costs (for example, emergency response and property dam-
age) and intangible costs (for example, death and impacted
community connectedness) (DAE 2017). As the costs of
disasters rise globally, there is increasing contention around
howdisaster funding is allocated (Kellett andCaravani 2013;
Cigler 2017). National resilience strategies in Australia (and
elsewhere) heavily skew federal, state, and territory disaster
spending towards response and recovery, rather than miti-
gation measures taken in advance of disasters to decrease or
eliminate social and environmental impacts (COAG 2011;
DAE 2013; Coppel andChester 2014). Thesemeasures, such
as flood levees, early warning systems, and education pro-
grams implemented in Australia and internationally, have
notable proven long-term financial returns, but financial
outlay competes with post-disaster priorities (Shreve and
Kelman 2014; DAE 2017).
Over the last decade, critical scholars have pursued the
politics of resilience strategies, tracing the ways resilience
has come to increasingly dominate disaster and emergency
thinking and planning (Chandler and Coaffee 2016). The-
orists have argued that we are witnessing an historical
reconfiguration of the rationalities of liberal governance,
such that ‘‘liberalism is aimed today not at solving or
preventing the manifestation of dangers and threats to
security, but at making us forego the very idea and possi-
bility of security’’ (Evans and Reid 2014, p. 2). Enhancing
community and individual adaptive capacity is central to
the doctrine of resilience, which emphasizes the need to
accept and even embrace the unpredictability and uncer-
tainty of natural hazards in an increasingly complex and
interconnected world (Jon 2018; Sword-Daniels et al.
2018). The United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR 2016) embeds resilience
within a broad definition of mitigation, which includes
engineering techniques, hazard-resistant constructions,
environmental and social policies, and public awareness.
The lack of such measures in current post-disaster reac-
tionary approaches exposes Australia and other nation-
states to escalating costs, as little investment is made to
reduce the impact before disaster strikes. However, recent
disasters in the Australian states of Victoria and Queens-
land have acted as a catalyst for regional mitigation ini-
tiatives and strategies.
Informed by critical security literature, this article ana-
lyzes the nature of calls for, and the politics of, disaster
mitigation in Australia. We argue that Australia provides
an important case study for building an understanding of
change in disaster spending and mitigation theorizing, in
the context of growing concerns over household
insurability. Despite the extensive body of scholarship on
resilience, mitigation as a rationality of security remains
insufficiently studied. The article presents a detailed review
of government inquiries and commissions, policy docu-
ments, and academic work on mitigation in the context of
the Black Saturday bushfires (Victoria, February 2009), the
Queensland floods (December 2010–January 2011), and
Cyclone Yasi (Queensland, February 2011).
We make two main arguments. We argue that as a mode
of disaster security, mitigation operates as a complex
assemblage of logics and practices of protection, pre-
paredness, and resilience. We add weight to scholarship
that has problematized an oft assumed protection/resilience
binary (see, for example, Aradau 2014). We then consider
the impact of a government shift in funding priority
towards disaster mitigation spending on the politics of
insurability, and on the reliance on insurance as a principal
strategy for households to manage disasters. We argue that
insurance as resilience produces new iniquities, disre-
garding those without resources to make themselves resi-
lient and those whose resourcefulness cannot be
marketized (Aradau 2014; Cooper 2015).
We start by examining recent disasters and how
households fared under a post-disaster approach to spend-
ing, outlining the respective roles of government, welfare
organizations, and the insurance sector in disaster relief and
recovery. We then explore the argument for mitigation set
out in recent government commissioned inquiries into
disaster funding in northeastern and southeastern Australia,
why support for pre-disaster spending remains relatively
limited, and what greater investment in pre-disaster risk
management could look like within current climates of
‘‘shared responsibility.’’ In undertaking a close reading of
existing and proposed flood, cyclone, and bushfire miti-
gation projects, as well as mitigation recommendations
from Queensland and Victoria State Government reports,
we examine the politics of disaster mitigation that work at
the intersection of protection and resilience, and consider
the implications in terms of insurability problems.
2 Households and Home Insurance in Recent
Disasters in Australia
Among the costliest disasters in Australia are the 2009
Black Saturday bushfires (Victoria), the 2010–2011
Queensland floods, and 2011 Cyclone Yasi (Queensland).
Their respective costs were estimated at USD 3.0 billion
(response and damage costs; Teague et al. 2010), USD 3.7
billion (reconstruction costs; Holmes 2012), and USD 1.1
billion (property damage costs; DAE 2017). On a regional
scale, these figures are quite modest, but they represent a
microcosm of global trends (Table 1).
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2.1 The Role of Government Assistance in Disaster
Relief and Recovery
The Black Saturday bushfires were Australia’s deadliest
and most costly bushfires in history: 173 people lost their
lives, 414 people were injured, one million acres of land
burned, and 2029 homes were destroyed (out of a total of
3059 structures damaged or destroyed) (Eriksen 2014). Of
the homes damaged by fire, 87% were covered by some
level of home and contents insurance (Teague et al. 2010).
As part of Australia’s post-disaster focus, impacted
households, regardless of insurance payments, received
financial assistance from federal and state governments, as
well as charitable organizations (Table 2).
Eighteen months after Black Saturday, 99% of
Queensland was affected by floods and/or Cyclone Yasi: 37
people died, 2.5 million people were affected, and over
26,500 residential home insurance claims were made
(Holmes 2012; DAE 2017). Because the floods and the
cyclone occurred in quick succession, both events were
treated as the same emergency by the state of Queensland.
As with the Victorian bushfires (Table 1), households had
access to a range of government and community-raised
funds, some of which took insurance payouts into account
(Table 3). While insurance-based deductions raise moral
hazard concerns, they avoid households financially profit-
ing from disasters and targets those most in need (Trow-
bridge et al. 2011). This includes Queensland households
who did not have access to affordable insurance (TAGT
2015).
2.2 Insuring Disaster Relief and Recovery
Despite significant government funding post-disaster, most
households depend on insurance in their recovery. On
average, insurers in Australia cover nearly USD 900
million in disaster losses each year (DAE 2013) for an
estimated 96% of households with home insurance, and
71% of households with contents insurance (29% of
households had no contents insurance) (Tooth 2015). Black
Saturday alone resulted in USD 740 million in insurance
claims (Teague et al. 2010). Another USD 1.8 billion and
USD 1 billion were claimed respectively for the Queens-
land floods and Cyclone Yasi (DAE 2013). While pay-
ments were substantial, there were high levels of under-
and noninsurance, which in the case of Black Saturday was
found to have ‘‘stifled’’ the recovery process (Teague et al.
2010, p. 339). Lloyd’s Global Underinsurance Report
(Edwards and Davis 2012) estimated underinsurance for
each disaster in Australia between 2004 and 2011 at USD
83 million.
Private insurance is key to Australia’s overall National
Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG 2011), as is
common within industrialized nations, including the United
Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), France, and New
Zealand (NZ) (Krieger and Demerritt 2015; Worthington
2015). In national disaster reports (Teague et al. 2010;
Trowbridge et al. 2011; Holmes 2012), insurance is
understood as a disaster response mechanism rather than a
preparedness measure, because it addresses perceived
shortcomings and limits of mitigation strategies, including
land-use planning, building standards, and regulations
(Booth and Williams 2012). To this end, current public
campaigns in Victoria are promoting insurance as an
‘‘absolute necessity’’ (Victorian State Government 2017).
While the Australian insurance market is said to be
‘‘working well’’ (Coppel and Chester 2014, p. 2), and
insurance enables households to be more resilient, there are
several issues that appear to limit its efficiency and long-
term sustainability. In contrast to the centrality of insurance
in government disaster management, insurer promotion of
Table 1 Financial breakdown of select disaster events in billion US dollars
Disasters Total
loss
Underinsurance
gap
Insurance
claims
Post-disaster government
expenditure
US hurricanes (Wilma, Rita, Katrina) 2005 170 62% – 29.76
UK flooding 2007 3.4 38% 0.174
Chinese earthquake (Sichuan) 2008 125 99% 0.366 137.5
Japanese earthquake-tsunami (Tohoku) and nuclear disaster
(Fukushima) 2011
210 83% – 279.25
Thailand floods 2011 30 60% 13
Australia Black Saturday bushfires 2009 2.97a – 0.74a –
Australia Queensland floods 2010–2011 3.72b – 1.77b –
Australia Cyclone Yasi 2011 0.59b – 1.04b –
Blank cells indicate no data. Figures in this table have been drawn from diverse sources and have been calculated using different logics. They
should be read as indicative only
Sources Edwards and Davis (2012); a Teague et al. (2010); b DAE (2013), Holmes (2012), Queensland Cabinet and Ministerial Directory (2011)
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its adaptive qualities (Swiss Re 2016), and its wider cur-
rency in resilience discourses, O’Hare et al. (2016) argue
that insurance is in fact maladaptive, structurally embed-
ding risky behavior, and inhibiting adaption and resilience.
Significant rates of noninsurance also undercut its effec-
tiveness. For example, among Australian households with
building (96%) and contents insurance (71%) (Tooth
2015), underinsurance—defined as being insured for less
than 90% of recovery costs by ASIC (2014)—ranges from
27 to 81% (ASIC 2005). More recently, it was found that in
a total loss scenario 83% of households’ standard of living
would be lowered to some degree (Quantum Market
Research 2013).
Socioeconomic factors are central to exclusion from the
insurance system (Tooth 2015; Booth 2018). In Australia,
one in five households experience cash flow problems, and
almost one in three have experienced financial stress in the
last 12 months (VCOSS 2017). Research suggests that 32%
of low-income earners do not have home contents insur-
ance. Along with lower incomes, affording premiums (and
excess) is difficult because households in lower socioeco-
nomic suburbs face higher premiums due to postcode-
based claims and crime risk-pricing that increase premiums
(Collins 2011).
Affordability issues are amplified by insufficient market
competition and a history of ‘‘inefficient’’ government
taxes and levies (Coppel and Chester 2014; Tooth 2015).
Other well-documented factors have included difficulties
understanding insurance products (Enright 2013), a lack of
consumer awareness of supplementary costs such as tem-
porary accommodation and landscaping (Teague et al.
2010), cost deviations such as demand surges and changes
to building regulations (Olsen and Porter 2011; Legal Aid
2014), problems calculating ‘‘sum insured’’ (ASIC 2014),
and risk misunderstandings (Box et al. 2016). As insurance
decision making is not simply based on an individual’s
rational calculation of potential risks, households implicitly
or explicitly bring social and material concerns to bear
when purchasing a policy and this can also contribute to
Table 2 Post-disaster impacted household funding, 2009 Black Saturday bushfires (Victoria)
Payments Funding source Payment type Payment
Australian Government
Disaster Recovery
Payment
AU$65.4 millionc –
Federal Government
AU$1000 per adult;
AU$400a per child
Victorian Bushfire Fund
Appeal (AU$402 million
incl. interestb)
AU$4 milliona – equal
state and federal
contributions;
AU$375 milliona,b –
donations
Household repairs (short
term)
AU$3000 per householdd
Rehousing and recovery
(destroyed homes)
AU$35,000 per household; ? AU$15,000 contents;
(?AU$50,000 needs based)d
Rehousing and recovery
(damaged homes)
AU$15,000 per household (?AU$20,000 needs based)d
Rehousing and recovery
(tenants)
AU$15,000 per household (?$20,000 needs based)d
Winter needs (destroyed or
damaged homes)
AU$2000 per householdd
Support for boarders to
rehouse
AU$5000 for\ 2 people; AU$7500 for 3 ? peopled
Transitional support Homeowners: AU$10,000 singles/couples; AU$15,000
family of 3 ? ; Renters: AU$5,000 1–2 residents;
AU$7500 3 ? residentsd
Victorian and
Commonwealth
Payments (NDRRA)
AU$5 millionc Reestablishment (Structures)
Grants for structural
property damage
640 successful applications
AU$7.2 millionc Reestablishment (Contents)
Grants for damage to
contents
1181 successful applications
AU$4.5 millionc Temporary Living Expenses
Grants to cover essential
items
1,081successful applications
AU$6.3 millionc Personal Hardship Grants 8311 successful applications
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA)
aVictorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (2009); b Victorian State Government (2016); c Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction
and Recovery Authority (2010); d Victorian State Government (2010)
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underinsurance (Booth and Harwood 2016; Booth and
Tranter 2017).
Further factors that affect the rates of under- and non-
insurance are recent dramatic rises in premium costs as a
result of increasing claim numbers (particularly in relation
to the disasters of 2010/2011), and the progression towards
risk-reflective pricing predominantly for households in
flood- and cyclone-prone areas. For households at high risk
of natural hazards, costly risk-reflexive premiums are not
offset by national disaster insurance schemes as in other
countries such as the United States (National Flood
Insurance Program), New Zealand (Earthquake Commis-
sion), and the United Kingdom (FloodRe), schemes that
raise issues around long-term sustainability, risk commu-
nication, and mitigation incentives (Krieger and Demerritt
2015; Worthington 2015). While some households have
benefited from more accurate and granular risk calcula-
tions, for others it has raised premiums to unaffordable
levels. Households in cyclone-prone areas have faced
increases of up to 100% in four years and 350% for strata
buildings2 in just two years (TAGT 2015). For areas facing
frequent flooding, premiums have risen by 41% (Smart
2014).
The catastrophic impact of Black Saturday, the
Queensland’s floods, and Cyclone Yasi are a sign of the
future. Population growth, increasing infrastructure den-
sity, and migration to high-risk areas will invariably see an
increase of such events, with projections calculating eco-
nomic losses to rise to USD 29 billion in Australia by 2050
(DAE 2017). These calculations do not consider the risks
posed by climate change. Traditional funding arrangements
also appear unsustainable, as charitable funds will become
stretched with more households affected, and donations
dwindle due to charity fatigue (Latham et al. 2010). In
addition, the ‘‘imperfections’’ of insurance described above
lend support to the numerous government reports that have
concluded that the only substantial and sustainable strategy
for supporting current and future insurance arrangements is
through investment in disaster mitigation (Coppel and
Chester 2014; TAGT 2015; VCOSS 2017).
Table 3 Post-disaster impacted household funding, 2010–2011 Queensland floods and Cyclone Yasi
Payments Funding source Insurance
considered
Payment type Payment
Australian Government
Disaster Recovery
Payment
AU$850 milliona –
Federal Government
No AU$1000 per adult;
AU$400per childa
Premier’s Disaster Relief
Appeal ($205 million
with interestb)
AU$22 millionb – equal
state and federal
contributions;
AU$250.4 milliona,b –
donations
No Emergency Assistance (non-
means tested)
AU$2000 per adult;
AU$1000 per childb
Yes,
(?NDRRA)
Structural Damage Assistance
– Destroyed Homes
(means-tested)
Up to AU$280,000 per householdb
Yes
(?NDRRA)
Structural Damage Assistance
– Damaged homes (means-
tested)
Up to AU$100,000 per householdb
Joint State and
Commonwealth funding
(NDRRA)
No Emergent Assistance AU$170 per person, max. AU$850
per householdb
Yesb Household contents (means-
tested)
AU$1705 for individuals or
AU$5120 for couples/familiesb
Yes (? Other
NDRRA)b
Structural Assistance (means-
tested)
AU$10,500 for individuals or
AU$14,200 for
couples/familiesb
Essential Services Safety and
Reconnection Grant
(means-tested)
AU$4,200 for repairs and AU$200
for each essential service per
householdb
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA)
a Coppel and Chester (2014); b Queensland Government (2011)
2 ‘‘Strata title allows individual ownership of part of a property
(called a ‘lot’ and generally an apartment or townhouse), combined
with shared ownership in the remainder (called ‘Common Property’
e.g. foyers, driveways, gardens) through a legal entity called the
owners corporation—or body corporate, strata company or
Footnote 2 continued
community association, depending on your state or territory of resi-
dence and the type of scheme’’ (Strata Community Association 2019).
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3 The Case for Mitigation and Sharing
Responsibilities
At present, Australian Government funding for mitigation
projects is limited to approximately USD 20 million per
annum—a mere 3% of recent post-disaster spending that
funds up to 50% of state and territory (hereafter ‘‘states’’)
projects under the National Partnership Agreement on Nat-
ural Disaster Resilience (NPANDR) (Coppel and Chester
2014). In recent years, recommendations by government
commissioned inquiries into disaster funding in Australia
have emphasized the need for greater mitigation spending:
Governments overinvest in post-disaster reconstruc-
tion and underinvest in mitigation that would limit
the impact of natural disasters in the first place. As
such, natural disaster costs have become a growing,
unfunded liability for governments. (Coppel and
Chester 2014, p. 2, Productivity Commission Inquiry
into Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements)
The Australian Business Roundtable for Disaster Resi-
lience and Safer Communities reported that an increase of
USD 185 (AU$250) million per annum in mitigation would
more than halve the estimated 2050 disaster costs (DAE
2013). This assessment supported the Productivity Com-
mission’s (Coppel and Chester 2014) call for an increase of
USD 148 (AU$200) million per annum (reducing post-
disaster support to, and matched by, the states), but the
recommendation was rejected due to state government
funding concerns (SBS News 2016). The lack of support
from states is unsurprising, given the need for Federal
Government contributions to cover states’ existing expen-
diture obligations due to insufficient revenue generation.
The Northern Australia Insurance Premiums Taskforce
(TAGT 2015, p. xvi)—established to assess the feasibility of
two federal funding arrangements in response to unafford-
able household insurance premiums—concluded: ‘‘A sus-
tainable way of reducing premiums over the long run is
throughmitigation […] such reductions can only be achieved
by household action.’’ The Taskforce recommended
investment in a range of mitigation measures, including
research into more affordable retrofit options, education
campaigns, and the possibility of subsidies for low-income
households. When the Government’s response was finally
released late 2017, it stated the Federal Government would
not intervene in the insurance market, acknowledging the
importance of industry transparency and accountability, as
well asmitigation (O’Dwyer 2017).Nomentionwasmade of
the Taskforce’s recommendation regarding federal financial
support for household mitigation efforts.
The above inquiries represent a suite of calls for greater
investment in mitigation by the Australian Government.
These center on long-term savings and strengthening of
community resilience by reducing loss of life, physical
injury, impacts on emotional and mental well-being, and
social infrastructure (COAG 2011; DAE 2013; Coppel and
Chester 2014; TAGT 2015). They highlight the less tan-
gible impacts on individuals, households, and society that
are often ignored or ‘‘priced’’ in order to become com-
patible with political discussions (DAE 2016), as well as
the international disaster discourses that communicate and
calculate loss in economic and physical terms (Whittle
et al. 2012). A review of international cost–benefit analysis
of disaster risk reduction studies shows that precedence is
generally given to quantifiable economic and physical
factors over environmental and social vulnerabilities
(Shreve and Kelman 2014). Investing in pre-disaster miti-
gation measures recognizes the value of, and de-com-
modifies, disaster impacts on emotions, well-being, sense
of security, personal and family relationships, community
connections, and the meaning and values embedded within
places and everyday objects (Knez et al. 2018). Unlike
post-disaster approaches, greater investment in mitigation
can reduce both the financial and nonfinancial risks of
disasters. Despite such tangible benefits, the Australian
Government’s approach to disaster funding remains
stagnant.
Despite the Australian Government accepting the
inevitability of a changing climate (while still grappling
with the extent of human activity contributions), it remains
firmly cemented in practices that favor post-disaster
spending. A reactive funding structure that responds to
actual rather than projected costs has the potential to lower
opportunity and administration expenses. However, this
approach limits incentives to invest in mitigation, height-
ens risks of fiscal volatility and obscures funding trans-
parency (Coppel and Chester 2014). A reactive approach
keeps disaster funding off the budget, which assists the
balancing of books, but makes policy change difficult
(McGowan 2012). Consequently, disaster relief can be a
significant and largely uncontrolled part of the federal
budget, and state governments under the Natural Disaster
Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) lack finan-
cial encouragement to take greater mitigative steps,
including insurance (National Commission of Audit 2014).
In contrast to this unquantified, legally nonbinding, disas-
ter-contingent liability approach to government spending,
investing in mitigation measures ‘‘is an upfront cost that is
subject to trade-offs with other policy priorities as well as
the scrutiny that applies to the budgeting process’’ (Coppel
and Chester 2014, p. 360). Federal and state government
partiality towards post-disaster spending can also be
attributed to ‘‘political opportunism and short-sightedness’’
that result in reactive ‘‘policy on the run,’’ and
inequitable and unsustainable outcomes from seemingly
123
de Vet et al. Shifting from Response and Recovery to Mitigation for an Insurable Future
generous political acts during disasters (COAG 2011;
Coppel and Chester 2014, pp. 13, 4).
While the fiscal approach of the Australian Government
remains skewed to post-disaster recovery, discourses and
practices of disaster management in Australia have shifted
from an agency-managed approach to one that acknowl-
edges the importance of community members in develop-
ing resilience (Coppel and Chester 2014). This shift to
‘‘risk sharing’’ and ‘‘responsibilization’’ reflects interna-
tional trends that recognize the social, technical, economic,
environmental, and political priorities in mitigating disaster
impacts (McLennan and Handmer 2014). In Australia, the
concept of risk sharing is still in its infancy, as ‘‘the Shared
Responsibility discourse is articulating a new social con-
tract for disaster management but half of the contract terms
are missing’’ (McLennan and Handmer 2014, p. 6).
Guidance for shared responsibility in the National Strat-
egy for Disaster Resilience (COAG 2011, p. 2) emphasizes
that ‘‘communities, individuals and households need to take
greater responsibility for their own safety and act on infor-
mation, advice and other cues provided before, during and
after a disaster.’’ However, the Victorian Bushfires Royal
Commission (Teague et al. 2010, p. 6) argued that shared
responsibility does not mean equal responsibility, as State
knowledge and resources means the State, rather than
households, is better placed to identify andmitigate risk. The
Commission suggested the State should take a greater share
of responsibility, for example, through greater information
provisions and risk management, which is to be understood
and acted on by households.
While households, along with all three tiers of govern-
ment and some private sectors (such as energy providers),
are highlighted in discussions on shared responsibility, the
insurance sector has flown under the radar. This is partly
due to the private commercial status of the industry. Rec-
ommendations directed at the insurance sector and its
responsibility in risk reduction have been superficial,
underscoring the need for greater regulation around its self-
regulated code of practice in order to increase transparency
and accountability, and encourage more flexible products
(Holmes 2012; TAGT 2015). The limited integration of
insurers into the shared responsibility discourse can be
explained by the maladaptive operational logics of the
insurance sector. For example, in the aftermath of the 2013
Blue Mountains bushfires in New South Wales, 65% of
residents found themselves underinsured largely due to a
lack of knowledge on changes to Bushfire Attack Level
(BAL)3 zoning (Legal Aid 2014). While insurers had
knowledge of these changes and were called out (along
with local Councils) by residents and politicians, the
Insurance Council of Australia stated that it is ‘‘primarily
the responsibility of governments to explain to constituents
the consequences of changes to laws or regulations that
they enact’’ (Madigan 2016). Insurers appear keen to retain
a focus on government responsibility, which limits their
own responsibilities and the risks associated with meeting
(or not meeting) these responsibilities.
There have been calls for the insurance industry to do
more, albeit for financial gain (EY 2014). Hawker (2007,
p. 24) describes the insurance industry as ‘‘a ‘barometer’ of
climate change impacts on society.’’ This places insurers in
a unique advisory position for policymakers, communities,
and other business sectors, with a role in cross-sectoral and
multistakeholder action. Insurers can also support greater
insurance uptake by improving insurance equitability,
discounts for mitigation measures, and through trust—
factors that contribute to underinsurance (Collins 2013;
O’Dwyer 2017; State Government of Victoria 2017; Senate
Economics References Committee 2017). This also
includes transparency in risk rating, where disaster risk is
currently bundled and often cross-subsidized with other
everyday risks, such as burglary and housefire (O’Hare
et al. 2016).
Insurers could be more proactive in encouraging
households to manage disaster risks. In the aftermath of the
Queensland floods there were few accounts of insurers
reducing premiums, or providing insurance coverage where
there previously was none (Bird et al. 2013). However,
some insurers are beginning to recognize household efforts.
Since 2016, two insurers—Suncorp (2016) and RACQ
(2016)—have offered premium discounts for cyclone mit-
igation measures. While Suncorp does not disclose which
measures are recognized, RACQ (2016) offers up to 20%
off the cyclone component of household premiums for
measures such as roof security, open protection, roof
replacement, and house retrofits that meet current building
codes. Such options are not available for other disaster
types.
The insurance industry could also contribute to house-
hold resilience by, for example, running awareness cam-
paigns on the importance of property preparedness,
utilizing post-disaster repairs as an opportunity to increase
resilience among existing building stock (Bell 2011),
greater involvement in building standards and urban plan-
ning (Booth 2018), funding contributions to public educa-
tion on risk exposure (Carter 2012), national data
collection, research and analysis on disaster assessments
(Matthews et al. 2002), and working with governments and
disaster management agencies on hazard identification and
risk assessment (King et al. 2013; Coppel and Chester
2014).
3 A Bushfire Attack Level (BAL) is a means of measuring the
severity of a building’s potential exposure to ember attack, radiant
heat, and direct flame contact. The greater the distance from the fire
the lower the heat flux, and therefore the construction standard is
lower.
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Ultimately, the lack of accountability from the insurance
industry in promoting long-term disaster mitigation mea-
sures comes down to conflicting business models:
Ambitions of insurance as a mode of resilience are
overwhelmingly stability orientated, rebounding to a
preshock ‘‘normality’’ where risk is absorbed by a
system, but rarely avoided or reduced. In particular,
fundamental principles of insurance, such as risk
transfer and moral hazard, along with operational
norms including risk pooling and betterment, limit
the extent to which adaptive behaviour can occur.
(O’Hare et al. 2016, p. 1185)
As disasters become more frequent and costlier, it seems
in the best interest of households, governments, and
insurers alike to take responsibility for risk mitigation
whenever possible. The long-term sustainability of both
insurance and government sectors arguably rests on prin-
ciples of risk adaptation and shared responsibility rather
than stability and restoration to a normality that seems to
no longer exist.
4 Securing Resilience
There appears to be a sound argument for increased
funding for mitigation and the sharing of responsibility
across governments, households, and insurers. However,
important questions remain relating to mitigation as con-
stituted by a broad array of protection, preparedness, and
resilience initiatives, ranging from traditional flood pre-
vention levees, to the retrofitting of houses. On the one
hand, conventional protection measures, such as flood
levees, align with long-standing maladaptive insurance
logics, promising to enhance insurability through a reduc-
tion in the risk of flooding. On the other hand, mitigation
measures designed to enhance community and household
resilience, such as retrofitting, face considerable barriers
from an insurance industry that is both unwilling to invest
in pre-disaster preparedness (thus the burden of financial
responsibility falls on individual householders), and is
largely unwilling and/or unable to price resilience in
premiums. We explore this in a critical examination of
existing and proposed mitigation projects in Australia,
along with mitigation recommendations outlined in gov-
ernment reports and relevant academic literature.
4.1 Floods: Hard Mitigation Measures
Proactive state government responses to flood impacts has
resulted in education campaigns encouraging households to
better protect themselves through property retrofits, main-
tenance and preparation, emergency response plans, and
building and utilizing social connections (Queensland
Government 2017). Yet for some households, the capacity
to reduce disaster risk is beyond their control. Government
investment in hard mitigation measures can instead alle-
viate vulnerabilities. In 2011 and again in 2012, for
example, up to 444 houses were inundated by flood waters
in Roma, Queensland. As a result, a USD 12 million flood
mitigation project, stage one of the Roma levee, was
completed three years later, protecting 483 houses from
1-in-100 floods (Urbis 2014). Along with the 4.9 cost–
benefit4 calculated over 50 years, a ratio comparable to
flood risk reduction activities internationally (Shreve and
Kelman 2014), the levee’s construction has reopened
household access to previously denied insurance coverage,
while reducing premiums for around 1400 households by
30%, or as much as 80% for high-risk households (Coppel
and Chester 2014; Urbis 2014). The levee stands to sub-
stantially reduce both the broader community’s collective
trauma and the physical, mental, and emotional strain
households endure during and after disasters to maintain or
rebuild the physical fabric and feel of their homes and their
everyday lives (Whittle et al. 2012; Dixon et al. 2015).
However, we note the residual risk implications in the
context of climate change increases for flood probabilities.
Greater financial commitment by governments to flood
mitigation would likely see an increase in similar hard
mitigation measures, including the long-awaited South
Rockhampton Flood Levee in Queensland. The levee—
proposed 25 years ago—would provide flood protection to
1000 homes that have recurrently been isolated by floods
for weeks rather than days. During the 2010–2011 floods,
households lost water and electricity supplies, were placed
at risk by compromised sewerage systems, and lost access
to homes, schools, and businesses due to 179 road closures.
In an area with high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage,
many households were ‘‘financially destroyed’’ and insur-
ance remains a barrier to resilience due to unavailable or
high insurance premiums (Rockhampton Regional Council
2013, p. 12). The proposed levee would offset the USD 30
million cost of raising the Bruce Highway, which is flooded
during 1-in-10-year floods, severing road access to central
and north Queensland and costing USD 60 million in State
economic losses in 2011 alone. Despite the USD 50 million
recently spent by all three tiers of government on flood
repairs over four years, the South Rockhampton Flood
Levee project has remained unfunded given the USD
37–44 million price tag (Rockhampton Regional Council
2013; Strelow and Holmes 2015). Funding the project
4 Cost–benefit calculates the tangible and intangible financial benefits
as a return on the initial financial layout. The higher the ratio, the
better the investment. A cost–benefit of 1.0 represents a full financial
return, with higher numbers representing additional savings—a 2.0
cost–benefit, for example, represents a twofold return.
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would provide households with protection from regular
flooding and access to affordable insurance coverage. It
would intercept current disaster and insurance mechanisms
that are socially and financially marginalizing many
households.
Combined with the variegated patterns of noninsurance,
disasters often entrench place-based disadvantage (O’Hare
et al. 2016; Booth 2018). Many socioeconomically disad-
vantaged communities are located in disaster-prone areas
across Australia. The capacity of these households to
reduce risk is often beyond their control, as no feasible
level of household retrofitting or property maintenance
could notably reduce flood impacts. Only government
funded mitigation measures can sustainably lower their
physical risk and reopen access to insurance systems
(Coppel and Chester 2014; DAE 2017). While the benefit
from such hard mitigation measures are directly felt by
households initially, in time these measures would benefit
society more broadly, as fewer high-risk households enter
insurance pools, reducing premiums (assuming savings are
passed on to consumers).
4.2 Cyclones—Subsidization of House
Infrastructure
Key to reducing cyclone impacts is property retrofits. The
importance of improving building strength is evident from
post-1980s building stock constructed in accordance with
stringent wind-loading requirements. During Cyclone Yasi,
only 3% of post-1980 buildings sustained damage, com-
pared with 12% of buildings built pre-1980 (King et al.
2013). For this reason, responsibility for mitigation mea-
sures has fallen to households. But retrofit options are not
cheap. The cost to strengthen roofs, doors, and windows—
building features most commonly damaged in cyclones—is
estimated between USD 8361 and USD 40,370 per house,
with variations dependent on retrofit aesthetics and per-
manency. Urbis (2015) calculated the cost–benefit ratios
for different retrofits, varying between 1.1 (over-batten
roofing over a 5-year period) to 12.9 (roof strapping over a
4-year period). In addition to longer-term financial savings
(and increased property values), retrofits should reduce
current unsustainable household insurance premiums. As
with flooding, this approach should also result in further
discounts for insured households due to reductions in
insurance claims (TAGT 2015). While the argument for
household mitigation is financially sound, the outlay
required by households is in many cases prohibitive.
Unlike flood or bushfire impacts, the force of wind
cannot be mitigated through hard measures (with the
exception of reducing debris). Consequently, managing
cyclones attracts little financial support beyond education
campaigns and emergency response. At risk households are
therefore disadvantaged compared with households facing
floods and bushfires. The previously disregarded TAGT
(2015) recommendation for household mitigation subsi-
dies, and research funding for more cost-effective and
aesthetic retrofits, could alleviate the financial burden,
particularly for lower-income households. It would allow
more households greater physical protection and access to
more affordable insurance. The TAGT (2015) recommen-
dation for education campaigns, designed to ‘‘improve
cyclone preparedness could be the most effective way to
reduce the number of minor claims’’ (Urbis 2015, p. 8).
Minor claims after Cyclone Yasi accounted for 86% of
claims and 29% of insured losses. Research estimates the
proposed education program would save households on
average USD 225–566 in damages, offsetting program
costs with a 3.2–14.9 cost–benefit, and reducing reliance on
insurance systems (DAE 2017). Together, mitigation sub-
sidization, research, and education campaigns could con-
tribute to a more equitable and stable insurance system, as
well as a reduction in debris, collateral damage, and
demands on emergency services (TAGT 2015).
4.3 Bushfires—Retrofitting Properties
Current bushfire mitigation measures are well-rounded and
established, with emphasis on community engagement,
development restrictions, building regulations, hazard
reduction strategies, and emergency response. Such
strategies are reflected in the Victorian State Government’s
(2011) response to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal
Commission’s (Teague et al. 2010) recommendations, over
a quarter of which directly support households in prepa-
ration and response. However, the Commission’s recom-
mendations for fireproof landscaping and safety measures
for existing buildings did not consider the financial and
time costs required from households.
Current estimates for property preparations range
between USD 6600 and USD 34,800 (averaging USD
18,200) (Penman et al. 2017), with an average of USD
7400 for initial outlays and USD 740 per annum for
maintenance costs (Penman et al. 2016). While a well-
prepared home increases the likelihood of a property sur-
viving a bushfire, the above studies found that the financial
and labor costs of preparations and/or retrofits are beyond
what many households are willing or able to pay. Penman
et al. (2016, 2017) suggest that for households who accept
responsibility for their own risk, a shared-investment
property mitigation scheme and case-specific information
could positively improve household resilience. The latter is
important, given that many residents struggle to apply
generic bushfire advice to their property (Penman et al.
2017).
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Supporting households to undertake property improve-
ments will become more important in future insurance
contexts. Unlike floods and cyclones, risk-pricing for
bushfires is only now beginning to be calculated in insur-
ance premiums, as bushfires have previously been consid-
ered a negligible risk (King et al. 2013). This change is
likely the result of insurance administrative costs, popula-
tion growth, and asset increase in high-risk areas, the rising
frequency and intensity of high-fire-danger-days,
improvements in risk mapping, and the capacity of insurers
to encourage households to take responsibility for their
own risk (Teague et al. 2010; Booth and Tranter 2017). As
with cyclones, financial support for household retrofits are
envisaged to counter future insurance increases, contribute
to greater community resilience by reducing fire risk in
adjoining areas, and assist the sustainability of insurance
systems by limiting future claims. More broadly, mitiga-
tion measures can reduce the traumatic experiences of
survivors and firefighters and the associated short- and
long-term consequences (Caruana 2010; Eriksen 2014).
4.4 Current Barriers to Household Mitigation
Measures
In line with shared-responsibility frameworks, households
are being encouraged to become more self-sufficient and
accept greater responsibility for their risk management.
However, expectations around household contributions and
how these actions can be communicated are commonly
based on standard assumptions about household capacities
and behaviors. Most strategies assume households have the
physical and mental capacity to understand and implement
mitigation measures. However, in many instances, this is
not the case (Eriksen 2014; Sword-Daniels et al. 2018).
Older people in remote areas of Australia, for example,
have been found at higher risk of cyclone impacts due to
their physical inability to clear gutters and a lack of social
support (Astill and Miller 2016). Australian programs, such
as AIDER (Assist Infirm, Disabled and Elderly Residents),
provide services that support at risk communities, but
resources and geography provide significant barriers to
outreach.
Strategies for reducing risk, including adequate insur-
ance, are also built around the assumption that households
will act as rational agents. They assume that households
have the time and financial capacity to implement and
maintain measures, understand and accept the hazards and
risks they face, and appreciate the long-term value of
mitigation investments (Craik et al. 2012; Penman et al.
2016). They also assume that higher-income households
are more likely to invest in mitigation due to the avail-
ability of funds. In reality, there are few points of traction
within the life cycle of a house where substantial changes
to a property are made, such as property purchase, rebuild,
and insurance purchase and renewal (O’Connell et al.
2015). This is particularly true for landlords who have legal
restrictions pertaining to property access, as do tenants with
regard to the implementation of measures (Bird et al. 2013;
O’Hare et al. 2016).
Barriers to greater mitigation investment that influence
decision making at all levels of government permeate
through to decisions at the household level. Barriers,
regardless of the level at which they operate, will need to
be addressed if strategies are to be successful, and to avoid
further disadvantaging marginalized groups.
5 Conclusion
Building on growing demand for greater government
investment in disaster mitigation, this article has examined
how an increase in mitigation funding might affect
household insurance access and affordability. In focusing
on the household, we want to conclude by making four
points. First, our review underscores that, unlike post-dis-
aster response and recovery, investment in mitigation
measures works to intercept and lessen the potential impact
before damage is done. The impacts of disasters are more
than numerical figures or quantified outcomes used to gain
currency in political decision making. For households, the
impact can be physically and emotionally traumatic
through damage to, or erasure of, local environments and
livelihoods, social relations, and daily routines, which aid
everyday meaning-making and a sense of security. These
impacts are felt and endured by households in ways that
cannot be measured by the associated socioeconomic costs
of family breakdowns, health implications, or the loss of
individuals’ sense of belonging and self-worth.
Second, as the analysis of mitigation makes clear,
security logics are strongly shaped by the configurations of
different disaster types. Cyclones, for example, exceed
endeavors to govern through logics of protection, in con-
trast to the continued hold that protection logics have on
flood mitigation efforts. Each disaster type requires tailored
mitigation approaches that respond to disaster-specific
impacts and gaps in current disaster reduction efforts. In
the examples provided in this article, mitigation projects
have reduced the frequency of property flooding, commu-
nity isolation, and restricted access to water, electricity,
and sewerage systems. They can provide financial support
for housing retrofits that reduce building vulnerability,
providing households with a more secure space to shelter.
In turn, the different logics of mitigation at work for
different disaster types shape the politics of household
responsibilization. Under the shared-responsibility
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framework, households exposed to cyclone risks are left
with the responsibility of building resilience, as the impact
of wind and rain on properties cannot be diminished by
measures on public land, such as through flood levees or
firebreaks. While governments could financially support
households to better prepare their properties through sub-
sidization and investment in research for more financially
and aesthetically appealing mitigation measures, they
instead avoid investment in measures that yield little short-
term political gain, as such measures lack the grandeur of
hard infrastructural projects. The lack of current govern-
ment assistance for these households raises questions
around equity in government financial support for mitiga-
tion between disaster types, especially given that the gov-
ernment has recently ignored TAGT recommendations.
More research is required that considers the severity of
impacts and levels of need between different disaster types,
as well as the differences in state and federal policies and
regulations. The transition to a pre-disaster mitigation
mode of security is likely to do little to alleviate disad-
vantage and marginalization for householders in cyclone-
and bushfire- prone areas who lack the capacities to prepare
themselves and their properties, as the insurance industry
remains largely maladaptive in its operational logics and
does not marketize resourcefulness (Cooper 2015).
Fourth, in the case of all three disaster types examined in
this article, the implementation of mitigation measures
would likely improve insurance affordability and provide
insurance options where they had previously been
unavailable. Such outcomes are likely to partly reduce
cycles of social and financial marginalization, particularly
in areas exposed to recurrent disasters. However, while a
reduction in household exposure to disaster risks through
mitigation could make a significant difference to
equitable access and adequate levels of home and contents
insurance—a key goal of the National Strategy for Disaster
Resilience (COAG 2011)—the impact on insurability will
be determined by the specific logics of mitigation. Pro-
tective mitigation initiatives such as flood levees work
within existing maladaptive insurance frameworks and
have the potential to reduce risk and premiums, and thus
increase access to insurance for the economically deprived
and those living in high-risk areas. However, such potential
benefits must be set against the significant political and
fiscal constraints that neoliberal governance places on
large-scale preventive projects, and the deepening indi-
vidualization of risk-reflective pricing, which limits insur-
ance cross-subsidization. Future premiums for Bushfire
Attack Level (BAL) zoning, for example, are likely to be
based on risk-reflective pricing.
Conversely, the implementation of mitigation measures
based on the logics of preparedness and resilience to
improve affordability and access requires a paradigm shift
in the operational and security logics of insurers. Insurers
have to be willing and able to price household mitigation
measures. While arguments have been made that such
expectations are beyond insurer capacity and responsibility
(TAGT 2015), our article points to the precedence set by
Suncorp and RACQ. For households who remain excluded
from insurance markets, and who are unable to implement
measures of their own, there are secondary benefits to
mitigation investment in the form of reduced risk posed
from surrounding properties, lessened impacts to commu-
nity connectedness, and lowered demand on emergency
services.
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